By P.K.Balachandran/Daily News
Colombo, May 20 – The UN plan to establish a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh to Rakhine State in Myanmar to address the Rohingya crisis is a complex issue fraught with domestic, regional, and international challenges.
The complexities involved are political, security, geopolitical, social, and logistical.
The interim government in Bangladesh led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus has conditionally agreed to the UN plan but faces significant domestic opposition. Politicians, security analysts, and the public are wary of involvement in external conflicts, prioritizing Bangladesh’s internal issues, such as economic challenges and political instability.
Critics argue that the government’s discussions with the Arakan Army (AA) and the UN lack transparency and consultation with key stakeholders like political parties, civil society, and the media.
The interim government’s decision to establish a humanitarian corridor into Rakhine has been made under undisclosed conditions, lacking transparency and public accountability, says the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) in its latest Security Insight.
“The corridor lacks legitimacy under international law, as it is going to be initiated without consent from Myanmar’s government, raising serious legal and diplomatic concerns,” points out BIPSS.
The Arakan Army (AA), which is not recognized as a sovereign actor, is an unreliable partner due to historical ties with Chinese-backed militias like the United Wa State Army, it is pointed.
“Recent unauthorized Arakan Army incursions into Bangladesh, heighten the risk of cross-border instability and challenge national sovereignty. The absence of military quarantine along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border defies standard border protection protocols amid active conflict, leaving the region vulnerable,” it adds.
Withot parliamentary oversight and expert consultation, the corridor agreement sets a dangerous precedent of bypassing democratic mechanisms in foreign and security policy decisions. Further, no official demarcation or operational blueprint for the corridor has been released, and the identity of its regulatory and security authority remains undefined.
A poorly managed corridor may become a conduit for narcotics and arms smuggling, amplifying security threats from existing trafficking routes through Myanmar, BIPSS warns.
Further, establishing a corridor outside established international frameworks may set a precedent for future interventions in Bangladesh under similar justifications. Again, given Chinese, Indian, and Russian infrastructure interests means any unilateral move may provoke adverse responses from these stakeholders.
Myanmar Junta Opposes
The Myanmar junta, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, opposes Bangladesh’s engagement with the AA, which it considers a criminal group. The junta’s diplomatic protest in April highlighted its dissatisfaction. The junta’s consent is critical for any corridor to function. Without Myanmar’s approval, the corridor would be a non-starter.
However, Bangladesh’s National Security Advisor Dr.Khalilur Rahman says that the junta is talking to the AA even as it is fighting the rebel group. If the Myanmar junta can talk to the AA, why not Bangladesh, Rahman asks.
However, Bangladesh insists that the Rohingyas refugees in its midst must be guaranteed equal participation in Rakhine’s governance and full civic rights upon return. The AA’s willingness to meet these conditions is uncertain, given historical tensions and the Rohingya’s marginalized status in Rakhine. There is a religious and cultural dimension too. The Rohingyas are Bengali-speaking Muslims, while the Arakanese are Buddhist speaking a local language.
Establishing a corridor risks escalating violence, as it could strengthen the AA’s control over Rakhine, which the Myanmar junta opposes. This could provoke retaliatory actions, potentially drawing Bangladesh into a broader conflict, BIPSS warns.
There are fears of Myanmarese militants, including those from various tribal armies, infiltrating Bangladesh through the corridor. This could exacerbate existing issues like drug smuggling and the spread of religious extremism, further straining Bangladesh’s security apparatus.
The Myanmar junta’s recruitment of Rohingya fighters from groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) deepens ethnic tensions between Rakhine’s Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslim minority, complicating peace efforts and increasing the risk of violence.
Geopolitical Dynamics
Rakhine’s strategic location and rich mineral resources make it a focal point for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with projects like the Kyaukphyu port and Shwe gas pipeline. The AA’s control over much of Rakhine threatens these investments.
China’s partnership with the junta to secure them could provoke resistance from local groups, including the AA. Bangladesh’s involvement in the corridor could be perceived as countering Chinese interests, adding another layer of geopolitical tension.
India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) aims to connect its north-eastern states like Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura to South East Asia via Rakhine.
The AA’s dominance over Rakhine presents both a challenge and an opportunity for India to engage directly with the AA to secure its interests. However, the currently strained India-Bangladesh relations makes this a difficult proposition.
Alleged US Interest
Suspicions in Bangladesh that the Yunus government’s alignment with the US is driving the corridor plan fuel public opposition. Western sources emphasize that the corridor is a UN initiative, not a US plan at all. But the suspicion about US geopolitical motives ( countering China) is real in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has good relations with China, and it does not want US involvement in the corridor to spoil it.
Historical mistrust and ethnic divisions between the Buddhist Arakanese and Muslim Rohingyas, exacerbated by human rights violations attributed to the AA, hinder efforts to create inclusive governance in Rakhine.
The AA’s vision for inclusivity through the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG) is promising but faces significant hurdles in implementation, experts point out.
Myanmar is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, but in reality, it is dominated by the Buddhist Bamar, with others enjoying fewer rights. The various tribes are Christian who are in conflict with the Bamar.
The Bangladeshi public are reluctant to support the humanitarian corridor due to fears of increased refugee inflows in case fighting continues in Rakhine. The financial burden of hosting over 800,000 Rohingya refugees is already very high. Without UN aid, it is well-nigh impossible to look after them. But UN aid is subject to cuts due to donor indifference.
The UN has warned that without a corridor, starvation looms in Rakhine due to the on-going conflict between the junta and the AA. Delivering aid is critical to stabilize conditions and enable a “dignified” return for Rohingya refugees, the UN Secretary General has warned. But this requires cooperation from all parties.
The Numbers
Myanmar has so far identified 180,000 of the 800,000 Rohingya refugees as eligible for return, with 70,000 more pending verification. But the slow pace of verifying the remaining 550,000 underscores logistical challenges and the junta’s reluctance to expedite repatriation.
The AA’s dominance over 15 of 17 townships and 90% of Rakhine’s territory, including the long border with Bangladesh, means it would play a central role in managing the corridor. However, its governance capacity and willingness to prioritize Rohingya repatriation over its autonomy ambitions are uncertain.
Establishing a secure corridor requires infrastructure to transport aid and refugees across a 271-kilometer border, as well as mechanisms to prevent misuse by armed groups. This demands coordination between Bangladesh, the AA, the UN, and potentially the Myanmar junta. Alas, this is currently unfeasible.
However, a corridor could facilitate Rohingya repatriation, easing Bangladesh’s financial and social burden in the long run. It could also improve relations with the AA, which de facto controls Rakhine, fostering regional stability.
Conclusion
The establishment of a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh to Rakhine is a multifaceted challenge requiring delicate navigation of political opposition, security risks, geopolitical rivalries, and ethnic tensions.
While the corridor could alleviate the Rohingya crisis and benefit Bangladesh in the long term, its success hinges on Myanmar’s cooperation, the AA’s commitment to inclusivity, and Bangladesh’s ability to address domestic concerns. Without broad stakeholder engagement and a clear strategy to mitigate risks, the corridor will remain a distant prospect despite its humanitarian urgency.
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Bangladesh, Myanmar, Humanitarian corridor, Security issues, Rohingyas,, China, US, UN,
