By P.K. Balachandran

Colombo, January 3 –Though India lost some aircraft in the four-day India-Pakistan air war in May 2025, it struck deep into Pakistan with missiles and drones while defending itself well against similar attacks by Pakistan, says Christopher Clary, a Fellow at Stimson Centre’s South Asia program.

In the conflict that began on May 7 and ended on May 10, Pakistani air defences interfered with or intercepted some attempted Indian strikes, but Pakistan showed a serious vulnerability to Indian air attacks, Clary says in his report entitled “Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025, Stimson Centre” published on May 28, 2025.

Military Firsts

The conflict represented several military firsts, the US analyst points out. It was the first time that India used cruise missiles on Pakistan, both the BrahMos cruise missile (co-developed with Russia) as well as the European SCALP-EG.

It was also the first time Pakistan used conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles on India, in the form of the Fatah-I and Fatah-II and possibly other types.

While drones have been used sporadically along the Line of Control in Kashmir and elsewhere for smuggling, this is the first instance of drone “warfare” in an India-Pakistan conflict where both sides employed drones with the intent of causing damage to the other.

Day by Day Events

On May 7, Pakistan had immediate success in a defensive counterair operation. It claimed it shot down six Indian Air Force (IAF) jets on May 7, five over Kashmir and one over Punjab. There is substantiating evidence that Pakistan indeed brought down up to four planes.

A Washington Post visual investigation found compelling evidence of three crash sites in India—two in Indian Kashmir and another in Indian Punjab. The Post went further in identifying two of the three crashed airplanes as the French Rafale and Mirage-2000. The presumption is that any downed aircraft in India were Indian rather than Pakistani. The Government of India had not labelled any of these crash sites as being those of Pakistani aircraft.

Separately, Reuters reported on May 7 that there were three aircraft downed in Kashmir alone, citing local government sources.  Foreign government officials confirmed to international media that at least one or two aircraft were downed in India in the early hours of the conflict.

How Pakistan achieved this apparent counterair success is unclear. International observers assess IAF pilots as being highly skilled, and several of the downed aircraft were relatively modern – Rafale deliveries to India only started in 2020.

Reason Why Jets Were Shot Down

On the reason why Indian jets were shot down, Clary says that it was perhaps because India chose to focus exclusively on terrorist- and militancy-associated targets in the initial May 7 strikes. A broader Indian campaign to suppress Pakistani air defences might have caused military casualties and undercut India’s desire to avoid escalation and demonstrate restraint, Clary says.

Political logic and military logic might have worked at cross-purposes, he adds.  

However, some outside observers speculated that the Pakistani success was the result of greater integration of ground- and air-based sensors with frontline fighter aircraft. Before the military clashes began, the Pakistan Air Force had previewed its potential use of Chinese PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles.

The recovery of PL-15 missile debris in India confirms they were used. At least one US official told Reuters that the Chinese J-10 was involved in the downing of Indian aircraft, which would imply PL-15 success.

Surface to Air Missiles

The Indian Air Force denied that the PL-15s hit their intended targets and pointed to unexploded PL-15s on Indian soil as a sign of at least some misses.

It is also possible that some or all downed Indian aircraft were hit not by air-to-air missiles but surface-to-air ones. Indeed, a senior retired Indian Army general had assessed that any aircraft losses were more likely to have come from the Chinese-origin HQ-9 system than the PL-15.

Moreover, it was possible that some downings—if indeed any took place—were the result of friendly fire, as fratricide remains a challenge for modern air forces, including India.

Kashmir Hard Hit

Kashmir witnessed intense firing with small arms, mortars, and artillery. Less frequently, tanks and anti-tank guided missiles were employed. But the two militaries refrained from attempting to permanently seize posts or otherwise redraw the Line of Control, but they did attempt to kill each other while keeping violence somewhat limited.

Ground forces primarily fought from static, hardened positions occasionally supplemented by small raids. While Pakistan claimed that some civilians had been killed in the initial wave of strikes, many of the civilian casualties from the crisis appear to have come from firing in Kashmir. More than 50 people died in firing near the Line of Control during the conflict.

Drone Duels: May 7-9

In the night of May 7-8, Pakistan began a drone and missile attack on several locations—the Indian government named fifteen places—in western and northern India. These drone attacks seem to have continued into the next night (May 8-9).

There is unequivocal evidence of Indian Air Defence (AD) firing both anti-aircraft guns and missiles across the two nights as they responded to what the Indian Director General of Air Operations called a “raid” that sought to “saturate” Indian air defence through “waves” of attacks.

India claimed that these attacks largely failed with minimal damage on the Indian side. The bulk of the evidence, including satellite imagery, supports that claim.

In response to the first night (May 7-8) of drone attacks, India undertook what it framed as a counterattack in the morning hours of May 8. According to an official Indian briefing, the counterattack targeted air defence radars and systems at a “number of locations in Pakistan.”

Non-Escalatory

But to signal its “non-escalatory intent”, India emphasized that its “response has been in the same domain, with the same intensity as Pakistan.”

The result, India assessed, was a “neutralized” air defence radar in Lahore. There is overwhelming evidence of this attack taking place.

India reportedly used a mix of Israeli-origin Harpy and Harop (a newer Harpy-variant) drones. Debris consistent with those platforms, as well as British-origin Banshee target drones (likely as decoys), was recovered in several spots across Pakistan.

Pakistani sources also reported that 11 sites were subject to attack and/or witnessed Pakistani intercepts of Indian drones on that May 8 morning. Pakistan’s military spokesmen acknowledged that one of the attacks injured four Pakistani soldiers and caused “partial damage” to equipment, perhaps validating at least in part India’s claim of having neutralized an air defence radar.

May-8/9 Night

The night of May 8-9 appears to have been characterized by a similar and perhaps somewhat larger drone attack by Pakistan on India, with no clear effect on Indian infrastructure on the ground.

There also appears to have been another retaliatory round of Indian drone strikes on Pakistan. According to the official Government of India briefing, “armed drones were launched at four air defence sites in Pakistan. One of the drones was able to destroy an Air Defence  Radar (ADR).

For its part, the Pakistani military claimed it had shot down 48 drones between May 8 evening and midday May 9. But contemporaneous documentation was lacking.

US Vice President J.D. Vance Intervenes

After the first drone duels, on May 8, US Vice President J.D. Vance gave an interview on the conflict where he said, “Our hope and our expectation are that this is not going to spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict.” But Vance argued for a policy of diplomacy and distance, saying “We’re not going to get involved in the middle of a war that’s fundamentally none of our business.”

Alarming Intelligence

However, sometime on the morning of May 9 the US view of the conflict shifted because of new “alarming intelligence.” Around 9:00 pm in Pakistan, 9:30 pm in India, Vance called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to express American concerns that “there was a high probability for dramatic escalation as the conflict went into the weekend.”

It is possible Washington observed Pakistani preparations for short-range ballistic missile launches. The Fatah-I and -II missile systems (and perhaps other missile types) were likely employed for the first time on the night of May 9-10.

Danger of Nuclear Option

The US tracked a number of indicators associated with Pakistani nuclear readiness. Around the time Vance was talking to India’s Prime Minister Modi on May 9, Pakistan’s military spokesperson declined calls for de-escalation and an end to the crisis. “With the damages India did on our side, they should take a hit. So far, we have been protecting ourselves, but they will get an answer in our own timing,” he said.

Climax: May 9-10

The night of May 9-10 saw the climax. The night witnessed a dramatic escalation of violence, though within the confines of standoff strikes on military installations. Shortly after midnight on May 10 (India time), there appears to have been an air intercept near Sirsa, India, approximately 130 kms from the India-Pakistan border. Some Indian press accounts suggested this was an Indian intercept of a Pakistani Fatah-II short-range ballistic missile.

Indian officials claimed there were “several high-speed missile attacks noticed subsequently after 0140 hours in the night at several air bases in Punjab.”

India Strikes Nur Khan Airbase

Around 2:30 am Pakistan time, India struck the Nur Khan airbase, which is part of the large Chaklala military cantonment near Rawalpindi. The blasts were sufficiently loud to wake residents in the nearby Pakistani capital of Islamabad.

The Indian Director-General of Air Operations Air Marshal Bharti explained in a post-crisis press conference on May 11, that following “relentless attacks” by Pakistani drones, the Indian leadership concluded it “was time to convey some message to our adversary” through a “strike where it would hurt.”

Bharti described the operation as “a swift, coordinated, calibrated attack” that “struck Pakistan’s airbases, command centres, military infrastructure, and air defence systems.”

Nur Khan, along with Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan, and Sukkur were all hit in the first wave of strikes, which was followed by strikes at Sarghoda, Bholari, and Jacobabad airbases. India also struck command and control or drone-related targets at Murid and radar sites at Chunian, Arifwala, and Pasrur.

Indian Strikes Successful

These strikes appear to have been successful. Commercial satellite imagery confirmed that attacks occurred at most of the airbases named by the IAF. In some bases, such as Sarghoda and Rahim Yar Khan, India decided to crater runways to temporarily halt take offs.

At other locations, notably Sukkur, Bholari, and Jacobabad, large hangers were hit that could have housed aircraft, though there is not clear evidence any planes were hit.

Kirana Hills Nuclear Facility Not Hit 

The most provocative rumour purported that India hit an alleged nuclear storage facility in Kirana Hills near Sarghoda. But the evidence was minimal.

The IAF denied it conducted such a strike. But the Nur Khan airbase, which was indeed struck, shares the Chaklala military cantonment having Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which has responsibility for nuclear planning. Strategic Plans Division offices are over a kilometre away.

Was India “knocking on the nuclear door?.” India was aware of the political implications of striking so close to political and military leadership facilities. India may have been knocking, but it remained several doors away from the nuclear one, Clary says.

Conflict Ended Well for India

Having struggled on May 7, India’s achievement on May 9-10 is impressive by any measure, the analyst says.

Details of the operation are still limited, but the Indian Air Force reportedly used a mix of decoy drones and anti-radiation drones, like Harop, alongside an array of longer-range standoff weapons, including cruise missiles such as BrahMos and SCALP,  as well as solid-propellant rockets like the Israeli-origin Crystal Maze and Rampage missiles. Also, prior Indian drone attacks might have weakened Pakistani defences.

India’s complex, innovative attack on May 10 appears largely to have overcome Pakistani air defences. Whatever counterair surprises Pakistan had on May 7 did not appear to have had recurrent success on May 10.

Despite Pakistan’s claims of “major damages” at the 15 airbases in India, there is no visual evidence indicating meaningful damage on Indian facilities. However,  Indian officials on the morning of May 10 acknowledged “limited damage” from drone attacks at four locations  Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur and Bhuj.

Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles, which carry larger warheads more comparable to the BrahMos or SCALP-EG, did not create observable damage as per commercial satellite imagery.

Given this, it seems more likely than not, that many or perhaps all Pakistani ballistic missiles employed on May 10, were intercepted or they missed. Indeed, some Indian officials have claimed that all Pakistani missiles were intercepted prior to reaching their targets.

S-400s

For Pakistan, the S-400 became a target of focused attention. Official Pakistani sources claimed that their air force located, targeted, and destroyed an element of the S-400 system at Adampur, in Indian Punjab. Indian media reported that the S-400 was targeted by an air-launched Chinese-origin cruise missile but that the attack failed.

Despite Pakistani military briefers saying there are “loads of pictures” of Indian military targets, none have emerged showing a disabled S-400 component.

Reasons IAF’s Asymmetric Success

The Indian Army had acquired a suite of kinetic and non-kinetic anti-drone systems to complement its existing air and missile defence systems, Clary says.

According to senior Indian Army officers, the army explicitly sought to learn lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Ukraine wars. The army apparently had some success in designing a system and a set of operational procedures capable of minimizing the damage from reportedly large, sophisticated Pakistani attacks.

Diplomacy and Ceasefire

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stayed continuously engaged, both before and after the worried Vance phone call to Modi on May 9. In the final hours of the crisis on May 9, Rubio phoned Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Asim Munir. In the readout of that call, Rubio offered Pakistan an inducement, “U.S. assistance in starting constructive talks in order to avoid future conflicts.”

It appears that Rubio secured Munir’s agreement to pursue a ceasefire in that phone call or one shortly thereafter with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Dar.

In those final hours, a combination of military escalation alongside US pressure and inducement appear to have led Pakistani leaders to signal that they would cease additional hostilities if India did so as well. And India obliged to bring the curtains down on the conflict.

END