Colombo, December 27 (Pathfinder Foundation) -The terrorist attack at Archer Park, Bondi Beach, on December 14, 2025, is a modern-day example of ideology-driven terrorism inspired by the so-called Islamic State. A public religious festival with about 1,000 attendees was targeted by a father-son duo operating as a family-based micro-cell. The attackers were identified as Sajid Akram, 50, an Indian-origin Australian resident, and his Australian-born son Naveed Akram, 24, who opened fire on the crowd. Both had access to firearms, which were legally owned and used during the assault. The incident claimed 15 lives and left 40 injured, causing not only physical harm but also enduring psychological trauma within the community. 

Preliminary Findings

The target was both deliberate and symbolic. Members of the Jewish community had gathered to celebrate the religious festival of Hanukkah, popularly known as the Festival of Lights. The word Hanukkah in Hebrew means “dedication” and signifies faith, identity, and renewal. In targeting such an event, the attackers sought to achieve maximum symbolic and psychic impact.

Australian authorities immediately classified the incident as terrorism and launched a full investigation. Police shot the father and arrested the son. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was recovered from the scene and safely disposed of during the operation. Two police officers were wounded by gunfire, along with a civilian who was injured while bravely attempting to neutralise the younger suspect and is currently receiving treatment.

The investigations revealed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) symbolism, including two homemade flags and extremist literature, supporting the assessment of the ISIS-inspired motives, though ISIS has not formally claimed responsibility. The New South Wales Police said that the remaining suspect has been charged with a total of 59 offences, which includes 15 counts of murder and one of committing a terrorist act.

Investigators are examining recent travel by both suspects to the Philippines between 1 and 28 November 2025 to determine whether any form of international ideological exposure or connections may have influenced the attack.

The Police fact sheet submitted to the New South Wales local courts on 22 Dec states that the two gunmen recorded a video call in October about their plans for alleged attack during which they sat in front of an image of an ISIS flag and made statements condemning Zionists. 

The Philippines National Police (PNP) too has ordered an investigation into both suspect travel to southern Philippines to determine whether it had any operational relevance to the attack. While this region has been identified as a hotspot for Islamic extremism, Philippines officials have thus far found no evidence linking the Bondi suspects’ stay in Mindanao to any form of militant activity or training.  

Intelligence Gaps and Challenges

The details of the Bondi attack reveal some of the evolving challenges in counter-terrorism. Naveed Akram had been on the radar of local intelligence authorities in 2019. However, neither suspect was under active surveillance nor on any high-risk watchlist at the time of the incident.

New evidence has emerged linking Isaac El Matari, an ISIS operative arrested in 2019 after claiming to be the leader of ISIS in Australia and currently serving a seven-year prison sentence, to Naveed Akram, the accused Bondi beach gunman.

The Bondi case also highlights serious systemic failures in the intelligence and counter-terrorism domains. It is a disturbing lapse that the duo retained legal access to firearms despite one individual having been reported for ISIS-linked extremist ideology as early as 2019 and being linked to a previously arrested ISIS-linked suspect. 

These factors highlight the complexity of recognising long-term, self-radicalised mentalities beyond international boundaries, as they tend to be noticed only once they escalate into violent behaviour. Family-based radicalisation, as in this case, makes detection more difficult because it keeps extremist views within trusted home environments and limits external scrutiny.

Besides, other shortcomings were identified, including a lack of consistent follow-up, especially online and through community outreach, which failed to prevent the transition from radicalised thoughts to violent actions. These are tough questions and challenges that must be addressed by the authorities as part of their efforts to strengthen intelligence and counter-terrorism mechanisms.

Evolving Modes of Operation

The deliberate targeting of a public religious and cultural event marks a shift in how terrorist attacks are planned and carried out. Modern-day terrorism reflects a shift in which far more attacks originate from small, self-directed groups influenced by radical beliefs rather than from hierarchical command structures.

The Bondi case illustrates how prolonged exposure to extremist perspectives, often fostered through online content, creates a moral compulsion to act. When ideological beliefs and commitment evolve into operational intent and the pursuit of mass-casualty outcomes, the threat shifts decisively from abstract extremism to imminent and lethal violence. 

Lessons from Bondi: In Comparison to Sri Lanka’s Easter Attacks

For Sri Lanka, which still bears deep wounds from the Easter Sunday attacks, the Bondi incident offers critical lessons for national security planning. The attacks showed how extremist ideology can develop over time. It took approximately four years for Zahran Hashim and his associates to evolve from propagating radical ideas into a coordinated terrorist group.

Taken together, the Ebrahim brothers’ roles, along with those of family members of Zaharan, point to a number of trends, including family-linked radicalisation, independently made operational decisions, and deliberate target selection for mass destruction. They leveraged legitimate funding through legitimate businesses and kept much of the planning secret. This mirrors many key elements found in the Bondi attack as well. Though the scope and form were different, in both tragic events, global extremist narratives drove attacks specifically linked to significant religious events, with the rationale of creating fear and social division among targeted communities through mass destruction.

Early Intervention: The Example of Arugam Bay

On the contrary, the alerts associated with Arugam Bay demonstrate how prudent, accurate, and timely intelligence and early intervention play a significant role. The warnings issued with respect to potential threats to tourist hotspots and symbolic locations have led to an increased security presence, public notices, and visible deterrents to avert a potential attack.

This case underscores how coordinated domestic and international intelligence efforts, timely decisions, community awareness, and proactive security measures can disrupt the transition from radical intentions to violence. The tragedy in Bondi highlights the need for early-warning systems, through intelligence-led, effective surveillance mechanisms, to be incorporated into the counter-terrorism framework rather than applied in an ad hoc manner.

Threat Landscape and Strategic Focus

Sri Lanka’s terrorist threat landscape is indeed changing. The risk is increasingly coming from attacks by small, self-radicalised individuals or family-based micro-groups, rather than from large, organised terrorist networks. Such a shift demands close cooperation and coordination among intelligence services, law enforcement, and the military, underpinned by timely information sharing and joint threat assessments. Learning from the experiences in Bondi, Easter Sunday, and Arugam Bay are prime yardsticks to ensure security for public events, religious gatherings, and tourist areas-places especially vulnerable to symbolic attacks. 

From these comparative analyses, five strategic priorities for Sri Lanka emerge. Firstly, intelligence integration and early-warning systems should be developed to focus on behavioural indicators, signs of online radicalisation, and family-related extremist dynamics. Secondly, safeguarding religious, cultural, and tourist sites requires security planning centred on intelligence rather than reactive strategies. Thirdly, counter-radicalisation efforts must be augmented by credible public communications to reduce fear, foster community engagement, and prevent radicalisation from becoming violent. Fourthly, monitoring needs to be enhanced for firearms, explosive materials, hazardous substances, and extremist content online, particularly where lawful access and digital platforms could be exploited. Lastly, agencies need fast, coordinated crisis-response strategies to minimise casualties and restore public trust. 

With vigilance tempered by openness, within a robust national security policy framework, Sri Lanka will be better placed to build resilience, safeguard social cohesion, and successfully confront the heightened terrorist challenges. These are tangible lessons that point to an unequivocal course of action towards a safer, more secure Sri Lanka, which demands focused, firm action from the political authorites, as well as from professionals in the security and intelligence sectors, the media, and the public.

This is the Fourth in the series of ‘PATHFINDER NATIONAL SECURITY BRIEF 2025, issued by the Pathfinder Foundation.