By P M Amza/Colombo Telegraph

Colombo, February 7- The early months of 2026 have revealed that geopolitical stability is no longer anchored in treaties, institutions, or inherited norms. Instead, it is increasingly shaped by deliberate escalatory signalling—threats, tariff pressure, coercive diplomacy, and rhetorical brinkmanship—used by major powers not as precursors to conflict but as instruments to renegotiate advantage. This evolving strategic grammar is one in which escalation is deployed to produce de-escalation, compelling adversaries and even allies to recalibrate their positions rather than confront the consequences of open confrontation.

Several developments illustrate this new pattern of realignment. One is the widening strategic warnings issued by Donald Trump—from Greenland, Iran, and Cuba—reflecting Washington’s expanded reliance on coercive pressure to reset relationships. Another is the conclusion of the EU–India trade agreement despite American resistance, signalling an increasingly plural Western economic architecture. A third is the renewed diplomatic outreach of Canada and the United Kingdom toward China, evidence of a broader recalibration within the Western alliance system. And now, a fourth development stands out: the announcement of a landmark trade agreement between the United States and India, the details of which are still emerging but whose strategic implications are already unmistakable.

Taken together with the recent diplomatic overture by Türkiye—which has offered to mediate the U.S.–Iran standoff—these dynamics reveal a transformed geopolitical landscape. The post-1945 institutional order, once defined by structured multilateralism, has begun to give way to a system driven by reciprocal signalling, calculated ambiguity, and the episodic stabilisation of crises through pressure rather than consensus.

The Trump Method: Escalation as Leverage

President Trump’s second term has normalised a form of diplomacy in which calibrated escalation is used to compel strategic adjustment. His renewed assertion that Greenland could become a security liability if Denmark did not align more closely with U.S. Arctic strategy unsettled both Copenhagen and the European Union. While no military action was ever plausibly expected, the rhetoric itself shifted the Arctic security debate, highlighting Washington’s willingness to challenge long-standing assumptions about territorial governance in strategic zones.

The pattern has been even more pronounced in the Gulf. Confronted with regional attacks and maritime disruptions attributed by U.S. officials to Iran or its partners, Washington escalated its public warnings and reinforced its naval posture. Yet this did not produce war; instead, it triggered parallel diplomatic interventions by Türkiye, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Egypt, each moving discreetly to prevent a wider conflict while maintaining lines of communication with both Washington and Tehran. By late January 2026, Türkiye elevated these efforts, proposing itself as a formal mediator and reframing the standoff as one that required diplomatic management rather than confrontation.

Washington’s escalatory rhetoric has also widened beyond the Gulf. The inclusion of Cuba among countries facing potential punitive measures illustrates the geographic expansion of U.S. pressure, now aimed at states deemed aligned with adversarial powers. Such widening threats demonstrate that escalation has become a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy signalling—not to trigger conflict but to establish bargaining leverage.

EU–India Trade Agreement: Divergence Within the Western Alliance

The EU–India trade agreement remains one of the clearest markers of divergence within the Western economic order. Concluded in early 2026 despite open displeasure from Washington, the pact demonstrates Europe’s determination to pursue autonomous economic policy irrespective of U.S. expectations. Statements by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent—suggesting that Europe, by purchasing refined petroleum originating from discounted Russian crude processed in India, was inadvertently strengthening Moscow—only underscored the widening gap between American and European strategic trade preferences.

For India, however, the agreement reflected a deeper shift. New Delhi managed to sustain Russian energy imports, expand strategic cooperation with Washington, and simultaneously secure a major commercial pact with Brussels. This balancing act highlights the new asymmetric flexibility available to large middle powers, enabling them to chart multiple alignments without being subsumed into any single bloc.

The EU–India agreement therefore functions as both an economic instrument and a geopolitical signal: a quiet but unmistakable challenge to Washington’s reliance on unilateral sanctions and punitive tariffs as tools of global influence.

Canada and the United Kingdom Turn Back to China

The Western alliance system is also undergoing reconfiguration as middle powers diversify their diplomatic and economic relationships. In Canada, after several years of strained ties with China over technology security and allegations of political interference, a shift toward pragmatic engagement is now evident. Ottawa has acknowledged that trade diversification and supply-chain stability require a less ideologically rigid approach to Beijing.

The transformation is even more visible in the United Kingdom, long considered Washington’s closest partner. Economic stagnation, post-Brexit pressures, and the need for investment have pushed London toward rebuilding ties with Beijing. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s recent visit to China—with its emphasis on a “more sophisticated relationship” and policy adjustments including targeted tariff reductions and expanded visa access—marks a symbolic break from previous confrontational stances. It also showcases a broader Western trend: partners who once aligned seamlessly with U.S. preferences now pursue independent channels when national interests require it.

These engagements do not represent ideological realignment. Rather, they reveal structural diversification within the Western ecosystem—an adjustment driven by strategic necessity, economic pressures, and changing global power balances.

Fourth Development: The New India–U.S. Trade Agreement

A fourth development further transforms this geopolitical landscape: the announcement of a new trade agreement between the United States and India. Although the full text is not yet public, its significance is already clear. It reflects Washington’s recalibration after a prolonged period of tariff escalations aimed at compelling compliance from New Delhi, including penalties linked to India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian crude.

Paradoxically, these escalatory measures strengthened India’s bargaining position rather than weakening it. By 2026, India had secured a landmark agreement with the European Union, deepened strategic cooperation with the United States, and preserved its energy relationship with Russia—all while expanding its role across the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s decision to conclude a trade agreement represents an implicit recognition of India’s centrality in the emerging order.

For India, the deal reinforces its position as a decisive actor in shaping global supply chains, digital governance, and Indo-Pacific security architecture. For Washington, it demonstrates the pragmatic limits of economic coercion at a time when alliances are increasingly fluid. Even in its preliminary form, the agreement exemplifies the new global logic: escalation gives way to negotiation once both sides recognise the cost of continued confrontation.

The New Logic: Escalation as Negotiation

Across these developments, a discernible pattern emerges. Escalation is no longer a step toward war but a mechanism to reset the bargaining environment. When Washington imposes tariffs or signals military pressure, partners and adversaries alike seek ways to protect their interests—sometimes through alignment, sometimes through defiance, and often through diversification.

The EU’s overtures to India, Canada and Britain’s renewed engagement with China, and India’s simultaneous strategic deepening with both Washington and Brussels illustrate how escalation provokes recalibration rather than capitulation. Türkiye’s attempt to insert itself as a mediator in the U.S.–Iran crisis similarly highlights the growing role of middle powers in shaping outcomes within escalatory cycles.

This emerging dynamic does not restore the old institutional order, but neither does it produce chaos. Instead, it creates a system built on negotiated pauses, reciprocal signalling, and selective de-escalation—a world where crises are managed rather than resolved, and where stability is temporary but functional.

World Order Without Rules but Not Without Patterns

The post-war architecture—anchored in the United Nations, WTO, and similar frameworks—no longer moderates great-power behaviour in predictable ways. Yet the international system has not descended into disorder. Instead, it now operates through a sequence of pressure, adjustment, and temporary stabilisation. Escalation initiates a strategic contest, followed by diplomatic manoeuvres that yield limited equilibrium until the next rupture.

In this landscape, middle powers enjoy unprecedented room for manoeuvre. India’s ascent, Türkiye’s strategic autonomy, Brazil’s dual engagement with China and the U.S., and South Africa’s selective cooperation within a fragmented global governance framework all demonstrate the empowerment of actors once constrained by rigid Cold War alignments.

This diffusion of influence reshapes the mechanics of global diplomacy. With alliances loosening and new coalitions emerging, states pursue flexible, issue-based alignments that reflect national interests rather than bloc loyalties.

Sri Lanka: Navigating Escalatory Great-Power Politics

For Sri Lanka, this shifting environment presents both risk and opportunity. The Indian Ocean is becoming a contested strategic space shaped by competition among the United States, China, and India. Escalatory behaviour—whether through tariffs, maritime deployments, sanctions, or diplomatic pressure—could intensify vulnerabilities in areas such as debt negotiation, trade preferences, and port-related security concerns.

Yet the loosening of rigid alignments also creates diplomatic latitude. Sri Lanka’s long tradition of balancing relations with India, China, the U.S., and the EU provides a foundation for maintaining what can be described as strategic micro-autonomy. The EU–India agreement, India’s rapidly growing global profile, and the new India–U.S. trade deal open avenues for Colombo to diversify markets, strengthen economic diplomacy, and deepen supply-chain integration.

Seizing these opportunities will require disciplined foreign policy management, credible economic reforms, and a principled approach to non-alignment—one that embraces flexibility while avoiding entanglement in great-power rivalries. For small states, credibility and balance matter more than ever.

A Fragmented Future

The world order is undergoing profound transformation. Threats that once would have been viewed as extraordinary—over Arctic governance, Gulf security, or strategic trade negotiations—have become routine tools of statecraft. Escalation now serves as a mechanism to shape outcomes rather than a path toward conflict. Whether this produces sustained stability or deeper unpredictability remains uncertain. What is clear is that the predictable geopolitics of the past have given way to a landscape defined by shifting alignments, reciprocal pressures, and the normalisation of coercive diplomacy.

In this emerging world, escalation is not the failure of diplomacy. Increasingly, it is its starting point.

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(The author is former Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to EU, Belgium, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs)