By P.K.Balachandran/Daily News

Colombo, March 17 – Given the trend in the last few days, the deadly US-Iran war is not ending any time soon. Its intensity has only increased, and its canvas has only widened since the first US-Israeli air strike on Iran on February 28.

The world’s economy has already been shaken because of the virtual closure of the Gulf of Hormuz. And a prolonged war can cause political quakes both in Iran and the region, stretching from Turkiye  in the West to Pakistan in the East.

In the early days of the on-going US-Iran war, the US estimated that the fighting would last four to six weeks. But at the end of the second week, the Americans began to be vague about the timeline, only saying that “it could last longer.”

Meanwhile, the goal set for the US military was changed from regime change to pulverizing or severely degrading the Iranian missile and drone launching capability by relentless bombardment. This is now to be coupled with a new goal, namely, seizing Iran’s enriched uranium, through a land invasion by the Marines.

The Americans are not seeing the current Russian and Chinese aid to Iran in terms of missiles and satellite intelligence as much of a deterrent given the might of US-Israeli airpower. 

Even in the face of the stiff Iranian resistance, their offensive capabilities and the massive unpopularity of the war among Americans back home, President Trump is upbeat about his decision to wage war. He blithely described it recently as “an excursion”.

Expected Scenarios

There are different scenarios on the trajectory of the war and its consequences for Iran and the neighbourhood, right up to Turkey in the West and Pakistan in the East.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar believe that the long suffering Iranians will eventually take advantage of the degraded military and security apparatus of the Ayatollahs and throw them out by a mass action.

But others discount this assessment, on the grounds that it is based on a total misunderstanding of the nature of Iranian society, the moral/religious authority of the Ayatollahs, the Shia’s ideological commitment to martyrdom, and an ingrained nationalism among the Iranian people. Iranian nationalism is based on visions of Iran’s glorious Persian past and the fact that Persia has, over the centuries, withstood or foiled attempts by  the Arabs, Mongols, Ottomans, Russians and the British to dominate them.  

Gulf States      

Admittedly, the leaders of the Gulf States are with the US, being dependent on the US and the West to maintain their prosperity. But given the fact that they have become targets of Iranian missiles/drones, and the US bases in their midst have failed to ensure security against Iran, they could soon putting pressure Washington to stop the war.

There is also a feeling among the Arabs that American bases and weapons are for Israel’s protection, rather than theirs.

Exploiting Minority Grievances

If military action from both sides gets prolonged and the population is unable or unwilling to rise against the Ayatollahs, US and Israeli agents could very well foment or capitalize on minority ethnic discontent against Iran’s majority Persian-Shia community. The minorities in Iran are Kurds, Azeris, Arabs and Baloch, who could be potential sources of unrest, particularly in peripheral provinces.

Kurdish armed groups are the most organized. But experts say that they lack the manpower, unity, and external support for a sustained and armed secessionist campaign. Washington is believed  to be in exploratory talks with Iranian Kurdish militias about coordinated operations inside Western Iran, sharing intelligence and logistics. On its part, Iran has already targeted Kurdish bases in Iraqi Kurdistan to pre-empt cross-border incursions.  

According to experts, a more plausible outcome of weakened central authority in Iran would be localized insurgencies and cross-border instability rather than a full territorial breakup.

Minority groups in Iran have often agitated for equal treatment and recognition, for instance, for the right to speak and teach their native languages in a nation dominated by Persian culture.

The largest of the minority ethnic groups are the Azeri Turks, who represent about a quarter to a third of Iran. Kurds are about 10%,  while Arabs and Baloch are smaller, but notable nevertheless.  

Be that as it may, the popular Western view that Iran is controlled by Persians is not accurate, Iranian scholars maintain. All ethnic groups are part of the political equation. Iranians have cross-ethnic ties. The late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was half Azeri and half Persian. President Masoud Pezeshkian is half-Azeri and half-Kurdish. As a result, stoking ethnic divisions could prove a difficult.  

But others argue that in situation of chaos, ethnic groups other than the Persians, might want to secede if they can control some definable territory. This is what happened in the USSR after the latter’s collapse in November 1991. In the USSR, not every ethnic group was Russian or Christian. The ones in Central Asia were Muslim.

A Border Areas Problem

One factor that could worry the Iranian authorities is that the ethnic minorities live in provinces that border neighbouring countries. Arabs live on the border with Iraq, the Kurds near Iraq and Turkey, the Azeris near Azerbaijan and the Baloch near Pakistan.

Unlike other groups the Kurds have had separatist tendencies which Tehran had to put down. The Kurds are native to a vast but putative region called Kurdistan, which is spread over southeastern Turkey, northwestern Iran, northern Iraq and northeastern Syria. Kurds are the world’s largest group without a State and struggling for a State.

Some Kurdish groups have struggled for autonomy in eastern Turkey for decades, while a Kurdish militia called the YPG forms the bulk of US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces battling ISIS in Syria.

An armed uprising by Iranian Kurds could seriously damage Iran’s stability. The Baloch minority have links to Baloch separatists in Pakistan’s Baluchistan.  

Given the difficulty in subduing Iran by force of arms, the US and Israel are sure to rely on indirect methods of destabilizing it by arming and supporting at least Kurdish and Baloch groups.

Although the Iranian regime is resilient enough to weather these pressures, its future will largely depend on the way it deals with the current crisis and, later, the way it bridges internal ethnic divides.

Fallout in Pakistan

The rapidly worsening situation in Iran, notwithstanding the admirable resistance to external aggression, will have serious implications for Pakistan’s economy, internal security, border management and sectarian harmony, says The Diplomat.

The writer points out that Pakistan is engaged in an armed conflict with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the latter’s arm in Pakistan – the Pakistani Taliban. It is fighting a well-armed Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in Baluchistan. On the eastern front, there is an uneasy calm with the arch-rival India following the May 7-11, 2025  air war.

After the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by the US-Israeli combine,s violent protests broke out in the vicinity of the US Consulates in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Police had to use tear gas and batons to disperse the crowds. As many as 20 protesters have died in these protests. Meanwhile, in Skardu, Shia protesters torched the office of the United Nations’ military observers and the UNDP.

Pakistan is home to a large group of Shia Muslims, comprising 15-20% of the total population. Iran is the spiritual centre of the Shia Muslim world. Every year, thousands of Shia Muslims travel to Iran to visit shrines there. Therefore, a prolonged instability in Iran will have far-reaching consequences for Pakistan’s sectarian harmony.

In the past, Pakistan had been a victim of tit-for-tat sectarian violence, and the country has paid a steep price in blood to quell sectarian militancy. Its revival due to unrest in Iran bodes ill for Pakistan.

Pakistan shares a 900-kilometer-long border with Iran. There are deep-rooted cross-border ties between ethnic Baloch populations in the two countries. The Sistan-Balochistan area in Iran, and the Baluchistan province in Pakistan are witnessing ethno-separatist insurgencies. If the Iranian regime’s grip on Sistan-Balochistan weakens due to ongoing conflict, Baloch ethno-separatist groups will likely fill that vacuum. Sistan-Balochistan could become a staging post for more ferocious attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan province by the BLA.

Following the Iran-Israel war from June 13-24 last year, the Baloch Liberation Army-Azaad (BLA-A) faction’s head Hyrbyair Marri presented a charter of an “independent Greater Baluchistan”. Siimilar propaganda narratives could re-emerge if a prolonged period of instability befalls Iran.

Shot in the Arm for Jehadist Groups

At the same time, jihadist groups could expedite their violent activities by exploiting people’s grievances to advance their ideological agenda, Abdul Basit, writing in The Diplomat warns.

Jihadist groups like the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), al-Qaida and TTP have been trying to expand their footprints. While the ISKP is using Baluchistan to revive its networks, TTP has been winning over the loyalties of Baloch militant factions to expand in the province’s Pashtun areas. These trends will compound security challenges for Pakistan.  

On the economic side, Pakistan’s annual trade with Iran stands at $3 billion, conducted largely through barter and local currency arrangements. Unrest in Iran would negatively affect Pakistan’s key exports. A reduction in trade with Iran would have consequences for Pakistan’s energy supplies, border economies and regional connectivity. It will encourage illegal economic activity across the Iran-Pakistan border.

Given Balochistan’s large size, the economies of Baloch districts near the Iran-Pakistan border are more linked to Iran than Pakistan. Under exacerbated security situations, traffickers, smugglers and other non-State actors will thrive to the detriment of Pakistan, Adul Basit says.

END