By P.K.Balachandran/Daily Mirror
Colombo, May 21 – Modern democracies tend to be reluctant to use air power against insurgents because of the fear of causing collateral civilian damage and harming the bid to win the hearts and minds of the people. But that air power can play a critical role in counter insurgency warfare has been repeatedly proven both in the past and the present.
More precisely, air power can be an effective adjunct in a coordinated all-services engagement with deadly non-state actors.
Air Marshal Arjun Subramaniam, an Indian military commentator and historian, argues that use of air power is a must in counter insurgency operations and has cited, among other examples, the use of air power by the SLAF against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the Sri Lankan war. In his paper in the AIR POWER Journal Vol. 4 No. 2 Summer 2009 (April-June), Subramaniam asks: “What should be done when sub-conventional warfare escalates to levels wherein non-state actors use tactics and equipment that lend themselves easily to conventional warfare?” And his answer is, “use air power along with ground forces.”
Taking on the established military along conventional lines with sophisticated weaponry has become commonplace across the world. In South Asia, the LTTE had taken on all organs of the Sri Lankan State simultaneously with significant success over years, he recalls. The Sri Lankan State took years to realise that the ground war against the LTTE could be won only with active air support and finally crushed it without with an effective use of jet fighters, choppers and transport aircraft. The army on the ground felt reassured when it saw aircraft going ahead, pulverising the enemy even before they moved in.
India refrained from using air power against Kashmiri militants or insurgents in the North East except to contain Pakistani army incursions as in the Kargil war in 1999. This was partly due to political sensitivities and partly due to the absence of a doctrine to combine air and ground assets in counter insurgency operations, Subramaniam says. The fact that the insurgents were ensconced in urban built-up areas was also a major constraining factor.
Internationally, air power became a key element in conventional war during World War II, with the Germans using their air force to pulverise enemy assets on the ground before ground troops and tanks moved in. This was very effective in the early years of the 1939-45 second world war, but with the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Force developing better aircraft, the contest became more even. Eventually the allies prevailed thanks to sheer numbers.
But this was a conventional war. The opposing groups were conventional formations or regular armies of nation states. No non-state actors were involved.
The Gulf Wars/3rd. Generation Warfare
The two Gulf Wars (1990-91 and 2003-2011) changed it all. They were air wars. The initial invasion was characterised by a “shock and awe” air campaign followed by a ground offensive. The Gulf Wars epitomised what came to be called “3rd Generation” warfare. It was characterised by “speed, surprise, and physical dislocation”, says Air Marshal Subramaniam.
Importantly, “3rd Generation” warfare in the Gulf Wars was “indifferent to issues like winning the hearts and minds of the defeated enemy,” he points out.
4th Generation Warfare against Non-State Actors
Soon, the whole battle scenario changed radically. The world entered the 4th Generation Warfare phase. In this era, the State “lost its monopoly on warfare”.
The State found itself staring down the barrel of a powder keg that comprised culturally distinct, militarily well-trained and sometimes fanatical non-State actors who had perfected a pot pouri of guerrilla tactics with conventional firepower, terrorist ideology and religious Islamic fervour, Subramaniam says. ”Suddenly the State found itself woefully untrained to cope with such an enemy. This was the era of Al Qaeda, ISIS etc. These 4G War non-State practitioners utilised advanced technology and the media to spread their ideology and influence. This warfare model reflected a shift towards long-term engagements, where success was measured not by military victories but by the ability to erode an opponent’s resolve and legitimacy,” he explains.
4G War also bought to the fore cyber tactics and propaganda and misinformation also.
Iranian Revolution and Al Qaeda
Two developments changed the nature and intensity of 4G warfare in the world and gave it a religious fundamentalist flavour. These were the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Subramaniam points out.
“Not wanting to be left behind by the Shia revolution, radical Sunni groups with overt/covert aid from wealthy Saudi fundamentalists like Osama Bin Laden, started asserting themselves in semi -developed areas like Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus, creating a new, more assertive, and non-State actor,” he adds.
USAF Takes Doctrinal Lead
The USAF took the lead in forming a new doctrine to tackle the emerging menace. Technology proved to be a significant factor in making the US Air Force relevant in anti-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan. Air power facilitated reduction of attrition. It allowed ground commanders to reduce ground forces in specific areas.
Though it is recognised that ultimate conflict resolution would require ‘boots on ground’, air power has come to stay in counter insurgency operations to facilitate ground action, Subramaniam points out.
Need for Integration
However, Irregular Warfare (IW) or counter-insurgency warfare is complex. Air power will have to be integrated into a joint all-services fighting model that should even transcend the three services to include civil and paramilitary organisations also, the expert asserts.
Small-scale warfare has existed for thousands of years whenever unequals have fought against each other. The difference between then and now is that victory by the larger protagonist is becoming increasingly more difficult, thus, forcing him to question his basic tenets of warfare.
Asymmetric and Innovative Approach
Irregular warfare has to adopt asymmetrical and innovative approaches to erode an adversary’s overall war-waging potential.
“By no yardstick is asymmetrical warfare a lesser form of warfare in intensity. In fact, it is a notch above conventional warfare in terms of speed, ferocity and unscrupulous war-fighting techniques,” Subramaniam says. The main challenge for air power in Irregular Warfare is developing capabilities to fight both a conventional and Irregular warfare side by side.
“Unlike classic air power roles, Irregular Warfare missions have no fixed templates. Hence, they need to be flexible and responsive. Flexibility and responsiveness are attributes that lend themselves easily to air power as compared to land and sea power. This alone strengthens the case for increased involvement of air power in irregular warfare,” Subramaniam argues. The USAF’s Irregular Warfare doctrine urges airmen to integrate their capabilities with those of the other Services in order to prosecute what they see as a long war against terror and unseen enemies.
“We in India too need to leverage the competencies of air power in the fight against non-State actors. More importantly, there is a need to sensitise all echelons of leadership on the nature and complexities of 4G/Irregular Warfare.”
In an oblique reference to the Pakistan factor in the Indian context, Subramaniam says that the information technology revolution has made it possible for a non-State actor to effectively interface on a daily basis with the intelligence agencies of a supportive State and undermine the day-to-day functioning of a legitimately elected government.
But Subramaniam notes that now, there is a commendable effort in India to honestly attempt to articulate the nuances and difficulties of waging war against non-State actors.
“While the US and a few other Western Air Forces have focused on a platform-centric and technology intensive-based approach to air dominance that cuts across the spectrum of war and seeks the desired effects, smaller air forces like the IAF have had to tailor their approach based on specific threats and availability of limited resources.”
“The IAF’s Su-30 mKIs fighters are geared with similar capabilities and have all the typical characteristics of air dominance fighters that have comprehensively been showcased in recent times,” Subramaniam says. Recent conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare in Kargil, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and Sri Lanka have shown that air power, if used decisively, has the potential to dominate the path to conflict mitigation, de-escalation or even conflict termination. The Kargil conflict of 1999 was a classic example of air dominance in joint operations in a high altitude conflict. In Sri Lanka, the SLAF successfully dominated the LTTE from the air. The LTTE could not last beyond 2009 substantially because of aerial action using helicopters and fighters. The SLAF played a major role in troop-lifting and casualty evacuation.
“A small air force like the SLAF has shown what it takes to dominate from the air against a powerful insurgent non-State adversary.” The SLAF worked closely with the army and navy to defeat the LTTE.
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